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ENERGY INDEPENDENCE
Arthur T. Andersen
U.S. General Accounting Office*
Washington, D.C.
Nearly two years have passed since President Nixon
first proposed that the U.S. become energy inde
pendent. -- This to be accomplished by the end of
the 1970's. The proposal set in motion vast gov
ernmental efforts. As we all know, the "blueprint"
for Project Independence was soon forthcoming. In
this "blueprint" the proposed prospective date for
attaining independence was moved forward to the
mid-1980's. This perhaps was a subtle indication
of the difficulty of moving toward energy inde
pendence however one might wish to define this
concept.
I

Though many speak approvingly of the need for
energy independence, the term is not at all pre
cise. It embraces at least three strands of con
cern. The first is most cosmic in its orienta
tion. It focuses on the finite nature of exhaust
ible resources and the need to promote technical
and institutional change to stave off the impact
of increasing absolute physical scarcity. The
other two strands of concern see the energy crisis
in a more institutional context. The problem of
oil supply is one of control, or lack thereof
from our standpoint, rather than physical availa
bility. The U.S. has become dependent on trade to
obtain necessary petroleum supply. Such depend
ence makes us vulnerable to supply interruption
and with the present success of Opec, vulnerable
to price gouging.
Some would argue it is not useful or necessary to
distinguish possible underlying motives for pur
suing energy independence. Those most taken with
concern regarding pending absolute scarcity may
concede that control issues are at stake with
respect to petroleum supply. However, for them
these issues are not worthy of specific consider
ation because "we are going to run out of oil
anyway, aren't we?" In this light some go so far
as to assert that the events of 1973-74 are a
blessing in disguise.
In this context resource extinction is the touch
stone for debate as to alternative energy futures.
After all, as the argument goes, there is a finite
limit on the amount of petroleum that is avail
able at any price. The rate of growth of U.S. and
world consumption has been so rapid that we will
*The views expressed in this paper are the author's.
U.S. General Accounting Office.
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run out before long. The age of fossil fuel must
be viewed as transitory in the span of man's time
on earth. This theme was central to a recent
article in which the use of fossil fuels was de
picted as a bridge to the future. ]_/ A bridge
whose carrying capacity is already deteriorating
and whose collapse is imminent, necessitating hard
choices now as to the development of alternate
nonfossil energy supplies.
However correct it may be that we must ultimately
reduce or eliminate our reliance on liquid fossil
fuels, it nonetheless cannot be said that the
origins of the present energy crisis are rooted in
energy resource depletion. Since World War II,
world petroleum consumption has increased more than
3 fold. 2/ Even this rapid expansion, however, did
not keep pace with the discovery of new producible
petroleum reserves. As a result, the ratio of
proven reserves to consumption rose steadily. At
current rates of consumption more than 30 years of
supply have been identified. 3/ In 1976, it may
be difficult to remember - but for a decade or more
preceding 1973, petroleum prices in real terms were
trending steadily downward. 4/
True though it may be that we must pass from the
liquid fossil fuel age and in passing we must
develop suitable alternatives, the passage is not
yet near complete. Man's cup of oil may be half
empty but this also means it is half full and who
controls the cup and how that control is exercised
can significantly condition the comfort of the
remaining passage.
Too much discussion of the energy crisis seems to
forget that what happened in 1973-74 was precipi
tated by a cartel abruptly raising prices and
restricting supply. This cartel successfully
exploited and continues to exploit inflexibilities
in the economies and life styles of consuming
nations. For a time, some argued that the cartel
was weak and would fall apart so that no actions
by consuming nations was necessary. That talk is
more muted now. Success breeds success and no
cartel has been more successful than Opec. Per
formance in the last two years has taught all
members that cooperation yields enormous rewards.
The cartel's collapse will not come spontaneously.
Opec's future strength, though rooted in control
of low cost resources of exceptional magnitude, is
They in no way reflect an official position of the

nonetheless conditioned by the actions of consuming
nations.
For those who believe the cause of the present
energy crisis is primarily organizational, the
beginning point in policy planning is how do we
maintain or strengthen our bargaining position visa-vis the cartel we face? Developing energy
sources alternate to liquid and fossil fuels is an
obviously relevant option. But so also are others
including: actions to restrict petroleum use,
actions to provide buffer stocks against supply
interruption, and actions to broaden access to
alternate petroleum supplies. In all of this it
should be remembered that the name of the game is
not energy independence. Rather it is the develop
ment and maintenance of effective bargaining power
so that the balance of advantage in trade is not
excessively one sided. A movement toward energy
independence in this context is to be viewed as an
instrument of policy not an end in itself.
II
Whatever the motivations for seeking energy inde
pendence and however elegant our plans for attain
ment, thus far, there is little progress to report.
We continue to rely heavily on liquid fossil fuels.
Increasingly, projections of energy consumption
through 1985 reflect an expectation that the basic
patterns of energy inputs evident in 1975 will not
be vastly modified by 1985. 5j The cost and
environmental advantages of petroleum use, though
tempered by a fourfold increase of price, are still
operative. With present technology, coal, nuclear,
and solar energy sources are not close substitutes
in a wide array of end use applications.
From the standpoint of tempering the power of Opec,
there are no deeds to accompany the words of pro
ject independence. The U.S. now imports more oil
than.it did in 1973. Current daily rates are more
than twice what they were in 1973. We now obtain
nearly 40% of our oil supplies from abroad. 6/
Moreover, a larger portion of our imported oil
comes from Opec - 80% as compared to 70% prior to
September 1973. In addition, the pattern of our
purchases from the cartel may be feeding its
strength. Increasingly, our supplies are coming
from Saudi Arabia, described by many as the car
tel's lynchpin. Because of a low time preference
for earnings as compared to a number of other
cartel participants, the Saudis are known to be
among those most willing to restrict production
to preserve the organization's discipline in price
setting.
Government officials discussing the prospect of
Opec's next price moves reflect a sense of resig
nation. "Prices will rise. We hope not much."
This seems to be the theme. The resignation
appears justified despite two years of project
independence talk. It is interesting to note
that had the U.S. not increased its reliance on
imports--that is, had it remained only as dependent
as it was in 1973— the Opec council discussing
world oil prices next December would be facing a
situation in which overall demand for their pro
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duct would be down by nearly 10%. Despite all
talk of independence, among leading developed
nations, only the U.S. has increased its reliance
on the world oil cartel.
Ill
Does all this reflect a paralysis of policy? The
fair answer must be yes and no. Policy debates
and legislation of the last two years have yielded
at least two positive strands of development. The
first and most important is a refusal by decision
makers to pursue energy independence at all costs
--be they environmental or economic. Admittedly
the refusal thus far is tentative and new assaults
in favor of accelerated introduction of synthetic
fuels and other high technology energy supply
systems can be anticipated. However, the costs
and tradeoffs of such actions are now better known
and seem to have become relevant variables in the
decisionmaking process. The U.S. continues to
import oil not because self sufficiency is infea
sible but because at this point it is too expen
sive. '
The second positive strand of policy development
is a clear concensus regarding the need for con
servation. It is not an exaggeration to say at
this point that effective conservation strategies
are the one sure way of dealing with Opec restrictionson oil supply. Legislative recognition of
the need for conservation came early. Accompany
ing the creation of the FEA was the granting of
the authority to mandate fuel substitution require
ments in certain situations involving electric
power generation. Within the past 8 months,
efforts have accelerated. Two pieces of legis
lation have been passed which contain a variety
of programs designed to restrain energy demand
throughout the economy. The Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975 contained major features
designed to promote automotive efficiency. 7/ In
addition the creation of an infrastructure to
identify and publicize conservation opportunities
in the household and industrial sector was man
dated. The Energy Conservation and Production Act
of 1976 built on these initiatives in part by
introducing subsidies for the adoption of energy
conserving devices in certain sectors of the
economy and in part by setting in motion the
creation, adoption, and imposition of an energy
standard of performance for all new building
construction. 8/
The potential for conservation is not known with
certainty, but that it is large cannot be doubted.
U.S. consumption of energy per capita is signifi
cantly higher than that in other large developed
economies, reflecting the fact that historically
energy has been relatively cheap domestically.
The Energy Policy Project in 1973 concluded that
within 25 years energy service per unit of input
could be doubled in most sectors of the economy
with little or no change in life styles. 9/ The
FEA's recent survey of conservation opportunities
concluded that by 1985 conservation could yield
savings equivalent to nearly 3 million barrels of
oil per day, most of which would be translated

Report which projects a savings of up to 6 million
barrels a day by 1990 solely as a result of Federal
energy conservation performance standards for new
Though one may applaud present initiatives which
emphasize conservation as a key component of energy residential and commercial buildings. 13/ FEA
reports that in 1974 total household and commercial
policy, somewhat less enthusiasm or at least some
consumption accounted for 3.4 million barrels a day
reservation may be warranted with regard to the
of oil usage and projects, with low oil prices, a
instruments chosen for policy implementation. As
usage rate in 1985 of 4.8 million barrels. 14/ It
of now, the principal approach is to mandate a set
looks like the Congressional projection of savings
of standards--requirements and duties--for various
public and private entities. Thus the auto industry is at least 2 times anyone's reasonable expectation
of total consumption growth in the household and
is required to produce automobiles with certain
commercial sector between now and 1990. The six
performance characteristics. Architects and con
million barrels represents more than 20% of pro
struction contractors will be required to erect
jected demand for the late 1980's and more than
buildings according to minimum thermal efficiency
1/3 of projected imports. If Congress is right, a
standards. Major industrial producers will be
major step toward independence is in the offing.
required to adopt certain energy saving devices.
Unfortunately, the proverbial slip between the cup
Appliance manufacturers will be required to pro
and the lip is more likely.
duce only energy efficient products. The basic
foundation of our energy conservation strategy to
Estimates of savings, and techniques for accomplish
this point is the creation of an administrative
ment aside, present approaches to conservation have
process which defines duties and relies on the
a very clear disadvantage in that all savings are
effective implementation of enforcement procedures.
time deferred with maximum impacts not occurring
Even when incentives of an economic nature are
until the 1980's. This fact is obvious with
emphasized, government actions are heavily laden
regard to auto, appliance, and construction
with administrative procedure. The recently
standards which are yet to be put in effect. By
approved weatherization program for low income
their very nature three year demonstration pro
families would dispense grants with a maximum no
greater than $400 to each household to procure storm grams, even if effective, will not yield much until
success is demonstrated. The impact of the
windows, caulking, weatherstripping, and other
weatherization program for low income families, if
insulation materials. ]_]_/ Specifically excluded
from purchase under this grant are any energy saving all goes well, will not peak until 1980.
mechanical devices with a value in excess of $50.
In the meantime, our basic bargaining position with
Each grant would be considered on a case by case
Opec, as noted earlier, appears to be weakening.
basis with court review and appeal procedures to
Even if Congress' stockpiling objectives set for
assure equal treatment among all potential appli
1980 were attained tomorrow, the nation's basic
cants. To promote this program, $200 million is
vulnerability to supply interruption now would be
authorized. If it is totally expended, a minimum
higher than in 1973. The stockpile at maximum
of 500,000 grants will be processed.
would add only about 50% to total domestic stocks
normally available for consumption while reliance
The low income retrofit program is accompanied by
on foreign sources, and to use FEA's terminology
a broader program which, through loan guarantees,
insecure sources at that, have more than doubled.
encourages the installation of energy conserving
space heating and cooling devices in the household,
IV
commercial and industrial sectors of the economy.
This program too imposes very heavy administrative
The question of what more should or could be done
responsibility on government officials who must
in furtherance of energy independence especially
choose amongst alternate grant proposals, must
in the near term can be variously answered. How
assure compliance with approved proposals, and
ever, this paper chooses to focus on one option
must be prepared in the event of default, to
only-energy pricing. In the past two years, the
one instrument of policy Congress has consistently
take possession of, complete,
refused to employ in furtherance of energy
recondition, reconstruct, renovate,
independence objectives is the use of price incen
repair, maintain, operate, remove,
tives for liquid fossil fuels.
charter, rent, sell, or otherwise
dispose of any property. 12/
To this point the American energy user has been
shielded to a considerable extent from increasing
No estimate of administrative costs associated
world oil prices. Domestically, average retail
with delivering these programs is given nor is
prices are no more than a third to one-half levels
there any discussion of why possible alternate
currently in effect in all other developed nations
methods of implementation are ignored. Perhaps
(except Canada). More than one-half of the oil
even more important from the standpoint of energy
produced in the U.S. is sold at a controlled price
independence, expected energy savings are not
which is less than half that paid for foreign
specified or if specified include figures of
crude. ]b j Recent legislation frees stripper and
doubtful credibility.
tertiary production from price controls— presumably
because such output is price responsive. Nonethe
That Congress may not have complete grasp of the
less if an output response is in fact realized, it
conservation implications of its actions under this
must be considered in setting the "blend" price for
law is suggested by a statement in the Conference
into savings in imported oil. 10/
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crude oil. 16/ Under present regulations good
output response from the newly decontrolled sector
could force a rollback in prices allowed for other
sources of domestic crude output. Complimentary to
the regulation of oil prices is the long established
program to control the price of natural gas. In
consequence, more than 40% of the domestic energy
sector is subject to price control. Prices have
been maintained below market clearing levels with
imports making up the difference in the petroleum
sector and end use allocation accomplishing this
end in the natural gas sector.
The specific decisions of Congress at this point,
with respect to the pricing of liquid fossil fuel,
reflects the judgment that upward price adjustments
would entail undesirable social and economic costs.
Its view on this matter is not monolithic in that,
for example, with regard to petroleum, it does,
legislatively, promise deregulation within three
years. Moreover, the most recent energy bill seeks
to promote greater price flexibility in the sale of
electricity. Basically however, Congress has been
reluctant to view pricing policy as a potentially
effective weapon to promote energy independence or
at least to preserve whatever bargaining power we
might have vis-a-vis Opec.
Equity concerns particularly in relation to low
income consumers and the supposed unresponsiveness
of private decisionmaking to price changes are most
frequently used as justification for the present
policy stance. In this regard it is interesting to
compare the pre- and post-1973 policy systems. For
many years prior to 1973, national policy served to
maintain domestic prices above those prevailing in
international markets. Though critics argued that
such action was inequitable and resulted in an
unfair tax on consumers, the equity argument was
rejected. Instead pre-1973 the argument for higher
domestic prices was accepted as necessary to assure
the development of national petroleum supplies.
Post-1973, the tables are turned--consumer equity
receives paramount attention. Those that urge
upward adjustments in petroleum prices for supply
or conservation reasons are found not to be per
suasive. Do the facts warrant such a flip flop
or are other factors operating to inform policy
decisionmaking?
I think it is the latter. I believe further that
the relevant additional factors are three. The
first involves a general disenchantment with the
petroleum industry. The notion that "oil got us
in this mess so lets punish them" pervades much
political and popular thinking. Freeing oil
prices domestically is viewed as granting windfall
profits to undeserving cheats. A Congressional
ability to tax such profits, however, probably means
that the windfall profits issue is insufficient in
explaining present oil price inaction. Equally
and perhaps more important is the fact that begin
ning with the allocation of oil import quota
tickets and continuing now in the context of
entitlement allocation, strong vested interests
within the industry are working to preserve the
present two (or is it now three?) tier system.
Small refiners gain much from the present system
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of entitlements. Survival of certain sectors of
the petroleum industry might well be at stake should
the system be phased out. Thus one might say an
equity argument within the industry buttresses what
ever other equity concerns one may have regarding
appropriate profit levels for the petroleum industry,
or appropriate levels of prices low income consumers
should have to pay.
Overriding all of this is an apparent view that
systems of direct regulation are relatively costless
as compared to the use of market prices to guide
consumption and producer decisions. The question
of costs may be viewed in two contexts. The first
is administrative. Are present regulations capable
of effective administration? If so, at what cost?
My guess is that anyone's "yes" answer to the first
question must be ever more tentative and the answer
to the second must be "only at higher costs."
But neither are central to concerns regarding pro
gress toward energy independence. Rather more
important are the possible external effects of
present price regulations. Is it likely they make
us more dependent on foreign oil? Is it likely
they make us more vulnerable to supply interruption
and monopolistic price gouging? The answer to
these questions must be "yes" if prices serve any
function in determining energy supply and use
arrangements.
If price can still effect consumer behavior then
the present system subsidizes imports. We do not
price foreign oil on an incremental basis. The
consumer does not see a $13 barrel but rather he
sees a $7.66 barrel. Rolling in the price of
foreign crude, just as rolling in the price of
imported liquid natural gas, or (as has been
proposed) domestically produced synthetic fuel, is
a subsidy pure and simple. In the case of petrole
um, it is a subsidy for 0pec--the malfactors in the
world "energy crisis."
Among all major developed nations, the consumption
patterns of Canada and the U.S., on the basis of
most recent data, are least responsive to recent
developments in world petroleum markets. 17/ It
is interesting to note that both countries have
followed a low price oil strategy which diverges
significantly from Western Europe and Japan. 18/
The latter countries, though very heavily reliant
on foreign supplies have succeeded in reducing
their intake.
If the demand effects of the present oil price
regulatory system are stimulative to foreign
imports, what are the supply effects? At least
two points should be distinguished. The first
relates to the optimal level of price incentives
to stimulate production. The two price system
initially was conceived to encourage new produc
tion and marginal stripper production. It reflects
implicitly a notion that some parts of oil supply
are price responsive-otherwise why the higher
price? It reflects explicitly a view that those
parts of oil supply which are price responsive and
those which are not are administratively distin
guishable. To the extent this is not true, present

ion. They would stimulate the development of
domestic energy alternatives. They might sharpen
the cartel's awareness of our ultimate desire and
capability to counter their presently unrestrained
power. Jointly these effects would reduce our
vulnerability to antagonistic cartel behavior and
ease our transition from the fossil fuel age. They
might also reduce our need to rely on extensive
administrative procedure to pursue identified
energy policy objectives.

price regulations suppress domestic output and so
contribute to import dependence.

The second point of interest regarding present
supply effects associated with oil price regulation
involves the legislatively announced date for de
control. In effect oil producers holding old oil
and believing that decontrol will come in the
announced time frame, have an economic decision to
make. Do they produce now and sell at $5.25 or do
they produce in three years and sell at $11 or more?
To rely more heavily on the price mechanism as a
The specified prospect of decontrol has introduced
test of public policy does not mean we need abandon
a new cost calculation for the supplier. A barrel
social concerns regarding, particularly, issues of
sold now means the loss of higher revenue on that
equity. There are alternative means available to
barrel 3 years hence. Internal discount rates of
25% or more are needed to get that producer to want promote equity. Perhaps one of the main weaknesses
to part with his oil now. Could this be the reason of recent energy legislation is that it. tries to
serve too many social objectives in one package.
production in a number of areas of the country is
now falling short of previously approved MER's
This is not to say the many actions regarding energy
(maximum efficient rate)? Though Congress may be
policy in the past two years are of no consequence
reluctant to use price as an incentive to expand
output, it may have inadvertantly introduced a pro in defining appropriate limits to the concept of
energy independence and even in identifying possible
duction disincentive.
paths to attaining this objective at some future
time. However, short run benefits have been nil
To all this some would argue that it makes no
difference since price has no affect on our capacity and perhaps even negative. To the extent short
run opportunities have been missed we are more
to produce petroleum. It is difficult for this
vulnerable than 2 years ago. What does this mean
writer to accept such a judgment when an informing
for policy choice in the future should a new crisis
principal of petroleum policy pre-1973 was that
arise? Could it mean a stronger bias toward more
price did make a difference. It is even more
extensive direct regulation or a greater willing
difficult to accept if one is convinced that
ness to compromise environmental and cost standards
effective dealing in the present "energy crisis"
in facilitating the adoption of new energy tech
requires acute awareness of bargaining strategies.
nologies? You be the judge.
The outcome of any bargaining situation is uncer
tain. Participant preferences may diverge widely.
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